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A notable diﬀerence between the U.S. and many countries in Europe is in
the degree of ﬁscal decentralization. Regional (and local) governments in the
U.S. have signiﬁcant autonomy in setting their own taxes and determining
how to spend their revenues. This is not true of their counterparts in Spain,
France, the United Kingdom, Czech Republic and many other European
countries. In recent years, many countries formerly subject to dictatorships
or communism have been considering decentralizing ﬁscal responsibility to
sub-national governments as part of the process of democratization (see
Bird and Ebel, forthcoming). Yet, much of Europe remains immune to
adopting eﬀective decentralization in which sub-national units have true
taxing authority.
As Oates (1972, 1999) has argued, there can be signiﬁcant eﬃciency
gains to having a federal system with ﬁscally empowered sub-national levels
of government. On the other hand, such systems typically result in a lack
of uniformity in public good provision as sub-national units of government
with varying tastes and varying levels of income choose diverging types and
quantities of public goods. Garcia-Mil` a and McGuire (forthcoming) postu-
late a model in which people can have a preference for uniformity in public
good provision across regions, what the authors call solidarity. They ﬁnd
that, in countries where this is true, relatively rich regional governments will
voluntarily redistribute resources to relatively poor regional governments.
In the present paper, we argue that diﬀerences across countries in prefer-
ences for equality in provision of regional public goods can lead to dissimilar
choices over the degree of ﬁscal decentralization. In simulations, we show
that a decentralized system may Pareto dominate a centralized system if
preferences for regional solidarity are weak, and the opposite holds if soli-
darity preferences are strong. Thus, according to our model, it is possible
for a decentralized system to be optimal for the U.S. but inappropriate for
Europe.
In the next section, we characterize and evaluate the normative quali-
ties of three stylized systems of ﬁscal federalism: a completely centralized
model, a completely decentralized model, and a model in between these two
extremes in which the central government ﬁnances a minimum amount of
public expenditure, and regional governments have the ability to tax them-
selves to spend more. In section 3, we simulate outcomes under the three
systems, altering the preferences for solidarity from weak to strong. In sec-
tion 4, we present some empirical facts that appear to be consistent with
the theory and simulation results. We conclude in section 5.
12 A theory of ﬁscal decentralization with regional solidarity
We specify a model with a central government and n regional governments.
The regions have initial wealth ωi. Let ω =
Pn
j=1 ωj be the aggregate
wealth. There are two commodities: private consumption, ci, and public
expenditure, gi. Both are private goods.
We assume that all regions are concerned with inequalities in public























A Pareto optimal allocation is necessarily a solution of the following
problem: choose the private consumption and public expenditure levels















ci ≥ 0 i ∈ {1,2,... ,n} (3)
gi ≥ 0 i ∈ {1,2,... ,n} (4)
By choosing diﬀerent weights, αi > 0, all possible Pareto optimal allo-
cations are generated. The ﬁrst order necessary conditions for this problem
are therefore necessary conditions for Pareto optimality.



































− λ ≤ 0 i ∈ {1,2,...,n} (6)
Each of these inequalities must hold with equality if we have interior
solutions ci > 0 and gi > 0. In the case of interior solutions, from the

















































Equation (7) requires that the marginal contributions of private con-
sumption to social welfare is the same in all regions. Equation (8) requires
the equality of the marginal contributions of public expenditure to social
welfare in all regions. Finally, equation (9) establishes that the marginal
contribution to social welfare of private consumption equals that of public
expenditure in all regions.
As can be seen in the right hand side of (8), the marginal contribution
to social welfare of public expenditure in region i has two components: the
direct eﬀect, αi
∂ui











If all public expenditures are equalized, then gi = ¯ g and the indirect
eﬀect disappears.
We next present and characterize the choices made under three diﬀerent
systems of ﬁscal federalism:
a) Complete centralization: In this model, the central government im-
poses a uniform tax system to raise funds for provision of a uniform
level of publicly provided private good across the country.
3b) Complete decentralization: In this model, local governments have tax-
ing authority and revenue-raising responsibility. They are free to set
the level of the publicly provided private good without any interfer-
ence (or assistance) from the central government. They can decide to
make voluntary contributions to other local governments to help them
increase their public expenditures.
c) Guaranteed minimum level: The central government imposes a uni-
form tax system to raise funds for a central grant to regions that
supports a minimal (adequate) level of the publicly provided private
good in each region. Regions have local taxing authority that they
can employ to adjust the spending levels above the minimal required
level.
We compare the outcome for each system to the Pareto optimality con-
ditions.
2.1 Centralized ﬁnancing of regional governments
Under this system, the only source of funding for public expenditure is a
transfer, si, from the central government. There is no local power to tax,
nor the possibility of increasing private consumption by using subsidies from
the central government. Hence gi = si.
The central government has a common tax function for all regional gov-
ernments. The tax function is increasing in income or even progressive but
cannot discriminate by region of residence. To simplify the analysis we as-
sume a proportional tax, φ(ω) = tω, where t ∈ [0,1] is the tax rate. The
crucial assumption is that t is the same for all local governments.
Given some welfare weights, αi, the central government has to ﬁnd
t ∈ [0,1] and a vector of transfers, or equivalently public expenditures,












ci = (1 − t)ωi i ∈ {1,2,...,n} (13)
gi ≥ 0 i ∈ {1,2,...,n} (14)
0 ≤ t ≤ 1 (15)
4Local governments do not have decision power: public expenditure is de-
cided at the central level and private consumption is just a residual variable,
ci = (1−t)ωi, since it equals the after tax wealth. If there is decentralization
at all, it is just an “administrative decentralization”.
Recall that public expenditure is a private good that could be eﬃciently
provided by local governments. The only reason for central government in-
tervention is the existence of solidarity. We thus assume that the central
government provides equal subsidies to all regions, s = si. Consequently,
public expenditures are equalized across regions, gi = g. In the completely
centralized system the central government has two constraints: the tax func-
tion cannot discriminate across regions and public expenditures should be
equalized.




αjuj((1 − t)ωj,g,e) (16)




g ≥ 0 i ∈ {1,2,...,n} (18)
0 ≤ t ≤ 1 (19)












Notice that, according to (10), when all public expenditures are equal,
gi = g = ¯ g, the indirect eﬀect disappears. In this case, the Kuhn Tucker





















− λn ≤ 0 i ∈ {1,2,...,n} (21)

















The marginal contribution of public expenditure to social welfare is not
necessarily equal to that of private consumption in every region, as required
by Pareto optimality in equation (9). Instead, the average marginal contri-
bution of public expenditure to social welfare is equal to a weighted average
of all the region’s marginal contributions of private consumption, the weights
being the relative shares of every region in total wealth.
In general, the centralized system leads to ineﬃcient outcomes. The
ineﬃciency arises from the fact that income tax rules cannot discriminate
by region of residence and a uniform level of g is chosen by the central
government.
2.2 Decentralized decisions by regional governments
Under this system, each regional government has complete freedom of choice
of both private consumption and public expenditures. In addition, they can
set interregional transfers, sij ≥ 0, from region i to j which are essentially
voluntary contributions to solidarity. Each regional government chooses gi,
ci and sij (for j 6= i), taking all other variables as given, so as to solve the
following maximization problem
max ui(ci,gi,e) (23)
s.t. ci + gi +
X
i6=j




ci ≥ 0 gi ≥ 0 sij ≥ 0 (25)
The Nash equilibrium is obtained by solving simultaneously the n sys-
tems of necessary conditions. Setting up the Lagrangian of the i-th region:
L(ci,g1,{sij}j6=i,λi) = ui(ci,gi,e) − λi

ci + gi +
X
i6=j































− λi ≤ 0 with equality if sij > 0 for j 6= i (28)
We can make assumptions on the utility function (for instance a Cobb-
Douglas type) so that ci and gi are needed in positive amounts in order to
have a positive utility. This would rule out corner solutions. Yet, as we shall
see, corner solutions in the sij’s are unavoidable.





















Again, the marginal contributions of ci and gi to i’s utility are equalized,
but the indirect eﬀect does not take into account the impact of gi through e
on other region’s utilities (as required in equation (9) derived from the ﬁrst
order conditions for a Pareto optimum). Hence, the Nash equilibrium is
bound to be ineﬃcient because regions do not take into account the eﬀect of
their contributions to other regions’ welfare when setting their interregional
transfers. Equality is a public good.









Notice that, by assumption, ∂ui
∂e < 0 and therefore the interregional
transfer from i to j will only be positive if gj − ¯ g < 0, in other words, if j is
a region with below average public expenditure.






























(gi − ¯ g) >
2
n
(gj − ¯ g) (33)
and ﬁnally
gi > gj (34)
7that is, a region i sends transfers to region j if gi > gj and gj < ¯ g. Obviously,
a corner solution for sij arises when these conditions are not met.
A particular case of the decentralized model that we will discuss later
is the autarchy model, where interregional transfers are not allowed (sij =
0 for all i and j) and every region sets its own private consumption and
public expenditure levels. Thus, the only way open to local governments
to accommodate preferences for solidarity is to readjust their private and
public expenditure levels.
2.3 Decentralized decisions with a centrally guaranteed minimum level
We ﬁnally consider a mixed model that is a sequential game in which the
central government is a Stackelberg leader. In the ﬁrst stage, the central
government sets a common tax rate t for all regions. The revenue is equally
distributed as a subsidy si = s = 1
nt
Pn
j=1 ωj = t
nω, where ω is aggregate
wealth. This transfer sets up a minimum public expenditure level to all
regions. The i-th’s region total social expenditure is gi + s.
At a later stage, knowing the tax rate and the corresponding subsidy, the
regions are free to decide higher public expenditures by raising additional
revenue from local taxes. The second phase is modelled as a simultaneous
game with the regions as players. The strategic variables are the levels of
private consumption, ci, and the locally ﬁnanced public expenditures, gi ≥ 0.
Given the value of the central government’s strategic variable,the tax
rate t, and taking the values of the other region’s strategic variables as





s.t. ci + gi ≤ (1 − t)ωi (36)
ci ≥ 0 gi ≥ 0 (37)
The Lagrangian expression for this problem is:
L(ci,gi,λi) = ui(ci,gi + s,e) − λi (ci + gi − (1 − t)ωi)


















− λi ≤ 0 with equality if gi > 0 (39)





















Again, the marginal contributions of ci and gi to i’s utility are equalized,
but the indirect eﬀect does not take into account the impact of gi through e
on other region’s utilities (as required in equation (9) derived from the ﬁrst
order conditions for a Pareto optimum). Hence, in general,the equilibrium of
this game is bound to be ineﬃcient because regions do not take into account
the eﬀect of their decisions upon other region’s welfare when setting their
strategic variables.
The n equations given by (40), plus the n constraints (one for each
region), provide a system of 2n equations with 2n + 1 unknowns (private
consumption and public expenditure levels for every region, plus the tax rate
t). By simultaneously solving this system we obtain the region’s reaction
functions expressing the optimal responses ci and gi as functions of the
central government’s strategic variable, t. These reaction functions can be






s.t. t ∈ [0,1] (42)
The ﬁrst order necessary condition for an interior solution requires that


























dt can be obtained from the system of
equations (40) by using the implicit function theorem.
As we have seen, in general, the equilibrium of the guaranteed minimum
system does not satisfy the ﬁrst order conditions for Pareto optimality.
3 Simulation results
The results in the theory section can be summarized as follows. When
solidarity is present and demands for public expenditure vary by region, then
9each ﬁscal federal system analyzed is ineﬃcient. The centralized solution is
ineﬃcient because of the rigidities imposed by a common tax function and a
uniform level of public good across all regions. The decentralized solution is
ineﬃcient because of the free-rider problems generated by solidarity. Which
system dominates will depend on solidarity preferences.
In this section we simulate the systems presented in the previous section
to be able to characterize the relationship between solidarity preferences
and the degree of decentralization. By comparing a few simulations we
conﬁrm that when preferences for equality are strong the centralized system
dominates the decentralized one. Similarly, when preferences for equality
are weak, decentralization is a superior mechanism.
3.1 The utility function
We consider a very simple multilevel government with two regions. They
have identical preferences represented by the utility function





where ci ≥ α, gi ≥ 0 and e is the variance of {g1,g2}.
The parameter a can be seen as a subsistence level below which private
consumption cannot fall. The parameter γ is a nonnegative number cap-
turing the strength of the solidarity preferences. When γ = 0 there is no
solidarity. To clarify the nature of the class of utility functions, decompose
the utility function in two parts: the standard utility, K(ci − a)δg
β
i , rep-
resenting preferences between social expenditure and private consumption,
and the solidarity eﬀect, 1
1+γe. When there are no inequalities, the variance
e equals zero and the solidarity eﬀect takes its maximum value, 1. Total
utility coincides with the standard utility. When there are inequalities (the
variance e is positive) the solidarity eﬀect is less the one and the total utility
is less than the standard utility. The solidarity eﬀect tends to zero as the
variance grows to inﬁnity.
The standard utility is a Stone-Geary utility function. When a = 0 it is
a Cobb-Douglas function that gives rise to a demand for social expenditure
with constant wealth elasticity (η = 1). For positive values of a, demand
for social expenditure (taking the relative prices of social expenditure and









Hence , for positive values of a, prefereces are not homothetic and give rise
to non-linear expenditure systems.
The only diﬀerence between the two regions is the wealth level, ω1 = 80
and ω2 = 20.
For the simulations that follow we ﬁx a = 10, β = 1, δ = 0.5 and K = 10,
so that preferences of all regions are represented by the same utility funtion
u(ci,gi,e) = 10gi(ci − 10)
1
1 + γe
We do not assume a particular social welfare function for the central
government but rather represent the locus of all utility pairs achievable by
choosing diﬀerent values for the central government’s strategic variables.
The following items are represented in the graphs:
a) Utility frontier This is the set of all Pareto optimal utility allocations
satisfying the necessary and suﬃcient conditions discussed in section
2.
b) Decentralized equilibrium Di, the Nash equilibrium point described in
section 2.2, where every region has the possibility of setting voluntary
interregional transfers, together with the level of their own private
consumption and public expenditure levels. The central government
has no role and local governments have full taxing authority.
c) Autarchy equilibrium, represented by Ai, is the utility vector obtained
when each region independently decides its own levels of public expen-
ditures and private consumption, taking into account its preference for
solidarity. There is no central government intervention, nor the possi-
bility of interregional transfers. It is obtained as a Nash equilibrium
with public expenditure levels as strategic variables.
d) Locus of centralized allocations This is the set of all utility allocations
that can be attained by a central government that sets taxes and
allocates social expenditures equally among the regions as described
in section 2.1. The determination of the equilibrium of the centralized
model requires the speciﬁcation of a social welfare function. We ﬁnd
it useful to take as a reference a particular point, Ci, where, in the
11Rawlsian tradition, the utility of the poor region is maximized. In
our problem this would correspond to the extreme case of a utility
function with zero weight, α1 = 0, for the rich region. With other
weights, other points of the locus would be selected.
e) Locus of guaranteed minimum Here we consider a mixed system in
which there is a centrally ﬁnanced guaranteed minimum level of social
expenditure, and the regions can complement this with additional local
taxes. The locus of guaranteed minimum alllocations describes the set
of utility allocations that can be obtained as equilibria of the two stage
sequential game described in section 2.3. For every possible tax rate,
t ≥ 0, the regions play a simultaneous game. The resulting Nash
equilibrium utility payoﬀs are represented in the locus.
3.2 The no solidarity case
This is the standard case in the literature: when γ = 0 there is no solidarity
eﬀect and we go back to a model with a utility of the form
u(ci,gi,e) = K(ci − a)δg
β
i
We represent the utility levels attained under the diﬀerent systems in a
graph. Since all goods in our model are private, the decentralized solution,
D0, lies on the utility possibility frontier. The optimal voluntary contribu-
tions are zero, ¯ sij = 0, and consequently, the equilibrium coincides with the
autarchy solution, A0, in which interregional transfers are not allowed.
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Figure 1: Utility allocations without solidarity
12Under the completely centralized system, the interregional transfer from
the rich to the poor equals t
2(ω1 − ω2), so that a higher taxation implies
a larger transfer from the rich. The locus of centralized utility allocations
starts at the origin: when t = 0 public expenditures are zero (under this
system regional governments do not have power to tax) and consequently the
utility of both regions is zero. The utility of both regions increase together
with t up to the tax rate t∗, when the allocation C0 is reached. With taxes
higher than t∗ the poor region is left with too little resources to ﬁnance
private consumption. From that point on, the poor region’s utility starts to
go down and falls to zero when t = 0.5: after tax wealth is so low that the
poor region cannot aﬀord the minimum subsistence level a.
All the points in the centralized locus are ineﬃcient and lie well below
the utility possibility frontier. This is compatible with the standard theory
of ﬁscal decentralization: if all goods are private and there is no migration
from one region to another, tax wars are not possible and the decentralized
solution is best.
Two ﬁnal remarks. First, in our model regions have identical preferences.
Unequal wealth and nonhomothetic preferences are suﬃcent to make the
tax system ineﬃcient. Second, all points to the left of C0 are second best
ineﬃcient: they are all dominated by C0 in the sense the both countries
unanimously prefer t∗ to smaller tax rates. The part of the locus lying to the
right of C0 is second best eﬃcient in the sense that there is no alternative tax
rates allowing to increase the utility of at lest one region witouth decreasing
the utility of others. These are the points that would be chosen by a central
government maximizing a weighted average of the region’s utilities, as we
did in the theoretical section of the paper.
3.3 The weak solidarity case
Consider next the weak solidarity case presented in ﬁgure 2, where γ =
0.005. The locus of centralized allocations looks very similar to that of the
no solidarity case: it starts at the origin (when t = 0), and grows until
point C1, when the poor region’s utility is maximized. For the poor region,
represented in the vertical axis, a further increase in the tax rate (and thus
a higher transfer from the rich), will not be compensated by the more than
proportional increase in public spending because too little resources are left
for private consumption. For high tax rates, t = 0.5, the poor region’s utility
falls below survival. The whole curve lies below the Pareto-eﬃcient utility
frontier.
The important point is that in the presence of solidarity, the decentral-












locus of centralized allocations
locus of guaranteed minimum
Figure 2: The utility allocations in the weak solidarity case
ized and autarchy points are no longer Pareto optimal: they lie in the inte-
rior of the utility possibility set. The decentralized equilibrium, D1, Pareto
dominates the autarchy equilibrium, A1. The decentralized equilibrium D1
is much closer to the eﬃciency frontier and Pareto dominates a good portion
of the locus of centralized allocations. But it is in turn Pareto dominated
by a mixture of centralized taxes complemented by local taxation.
As was to be expected, the autarchy point, A1, coincides with the locus
of the guaranteed minimum system when the tax rate is t = 0. As the tax
rate grows, we observe that both utilities increase. Eventually, the poor
region reaches the point at which the centrally ﬁnanced public expenditure
is enough and th optimal local public expenditure is zero. From that point
on, the nonnegativity constraint for g2 in expression (37) is binding and only
the rich region uses local taxation for increasing public expenditure. The
transition to the new region can be seen in the graph as a kink in the curve.
There are many points in this locus (i.e., many central tax rates t) that
lead to allocations that Pareto dominate the decentralized allocation D1. In
brief, by comparing ﬁgures 2 and 1, we see that when solidarity is positive,
but small, the decentralized system is no longer Pareto optimal but still it
seems superior to the decentralized system.
3.4 The strong solidarity case
Consider next the case of strong solidarity, γ = 0.05, which is represented
in ﬁgure 3.












locus of centralized allocations
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Figure 3: The utility allocations in the strong solidarity case
Again, all the outcomes are ineﬃcient, but the centralized locus gets
closer to the eﬃciency frontier. The decentralized equilibrium, D2, still
Pareto dominates the autarchy equilibrium. And ﬁnally, there is a signiﬁ-
cant range of taxes for which the centralized solution Pareto dominates the
decentralized equilibrium, D2. The centralized system is superior to the
decentralized one.
As before, the mixed model of centralized taxes complemented by local
taxation performs very well. Most of the second best eﬃcient part of the
locus of centralized allocations is Pareto dominated by a solution obtained
from the combination of central and local taxes.
4 Some empirical facts
Our theoretical analysis and simulations predict that, in countries with a
stronger taste for solidarity, it may be more eﬃcient for the central govern-
ment to control the provision of local public goods and services. This result
implies a negative relationship between the strength of solidarity prefer-
ences and the degree of ﬁscal decentralization. In this section, we present
cross-country empirical evidence consistent with this prediction.
Relying on data from the International Monetary Fund’s Government
Finance Statistics 2002, we calculate measures of decentralization and soli-
darity for each of 14 countries. Our measure of the degree of ﬁscal decentral-
ization is regional and local own-source revenues as a share of total (local,
15regional and central) own-source revenues. Although ideally the denomina-
tor should be total consolidated revenues, we could not ﬁnd this measure
for most countries, and therefore we have chosen to miss some external-
source revenues by using own-source revenues, rather than double count
inter-governmental transfers by using unconsolidated revenues.
Our measure of the taste for solidarity is total (all levels of government)
expenditures on social and welfare programs as a share of GDP. This mea-
sure attempts to capture a taste for redistribution of income, which we
argue is plausibly related to a taste for redistribution of public expenditure.
It would be better to have a measure of a taste for redistribution among
regions. However, regional data are not available from the IMF, and, im-
portantly, a measure of variance of spending at the regional level could be
reﬂective of either a taste for solidarity or a taste for decentralization.
Table 1 displays our measures of a taste for solidarity and the degree
of decentralization for 14 countries. The country selection is based solely
on data availability for central, regional and local governments in 2000. We
have used accrual basis data when available, although for some countries
only cash-basis data are available (see the notes to the table for further
details concerning the data). We present the countries in increasing order in
their measure of solidarity, so that the relation between the two variables is
easier to see. The two variables have a negative correlation equal to −.453.
16Table 1: Solidarity and decentralization
Country Solidarity Decentralization
United States (US) 0,080 0,411
Russia (RU) 0,081 0,349
Argentina (AR) 0,090 0,403
Slovak Republic (SR) 0,116 0,050
Canada (CA) 0,129 0,523
Spain (SP) 0,135 0,189
Czech Republic (CZ) 0,138 0,161
United Kingdom (UK) 0,160 0,085
Norway (NW) 0,174 0,208
Italy (IT) 0,177 0,176
Slovenia (SL) 0,184 0,087
Croatia (CR) 0,191 0,106
France (FR) 0,206 0,125
Germany (GE) 0,225 0,345
Notes for the Table
Solidarity • All data for year 2000, except UK - 2001 and
Norway - 1999.
• Accrual basis data, except US, Slovenia, Slovak Re-
public, Russia, Czech Republic, Croatia, Canada, Ar-
gentina, Norway that are in cash basis Solidarity is
equal to the sum of social protection at the central,
regional and local level as a percentage of GDP.
• For UK, Slovak Republic and Italy solidarity is equal
to social protection at general government level as a
share of GDP.
Decentralization • All data for year 2000 except Norway -
1999.
• Accrual basis data, except United States, Slovenia,
Slovak Republic, Russia, Czech Republic, Croatia,
Canada, Argentina, Norway that are in cash basis
data.
• Decentralization is calculated as own resources (total
revenue - grants) at the regional and local level as
a share of total own resources (central, regional and
local governments).
17Figure 4 shows a scatter plot with solidarity on the horizontal axis and
decentralization on the vertical axis, with the predictive regression line im-







































Figure 4: Solidarity and decentralization for all the sample
The results of the estimated regression are presented in the ﬁrst column
of Table 2. We obtain a negative coeﬃcient as predicted, however, it is
statistically insigniﬁcant.
Table 2: Regression Results






Notes for the Table
Decentralization as a dependent variable.
Standard errors in parentheses.
The strong leverage of the German observation leads us to consider the
possibility that there may be measurement error in the decentralization vari-
able, which would have a strong inﬂuence on the estimated regression. It
18is in fact the case that our measure of decentralization has an upward bias
for countries where regions have important ceded taxes, but have little leg-
islative autonomy over them. In fact, the tax-sharing model established in
Germany attributes to the L¨ ander large amounts of own resources, as they
administer their own taxes, but, in fact, the L¨ ander have little autonomy to
set tax rates, deductions and other aspects of the tax system needed to have
true tax authority. Legislation regarding tax base and rates is the domain
of the federal government (see Rodden, 2003).
Thus, we have reason to believe that there is measurement error in our
decentralization variable for Germany. We present results in Figure 4 and







































Figure 5: Solidarity and decentralization excluding Germany
The ﬁt improves considerably, with an important increase in the value
for R2, and a slope coeﬃcient that is negative and highly signiﬁcant. Graph-
ically, we also observe that the predictive regression line better describes the
remaining country observations.
Given the small sample and admittedly questionable data, we are en-
couraged to ﬁnd the predicted negative relationship between our measure of
taste for solidarity and degree of decentralization.
195 Conclusion
Many public goods and services are provided at diﬀerent levels of govern-
ments in diﬀerent countries. An important subset of these goods and ser-
vices are publicly provided private goods and services such as education and
health. For these goods and services there is no advantage from a production
stand point to central provision or local provision. Because of varying needs
for these goods across localities, allocative eﬃciency is enhanced through
local provision. We show that this well-known result may be turned on its
head if individuals have a preference for solidarity.
In our model, solidarity is a public good in the sense that it creates
externalities that are not fully internalized by a decentralized solution. Once
the public good solidarity is introduced, the standard result of allocative
ineﬃciency of the centralized solution is confronted with the ineﬃciency
of a decentralized solution. The relative importance of the two types of
ineﬃciencies depends on the strength of the solidarity preferences.
To be able to quantify the importance of the two types of ineﬃciencies
present in our model and arrive at a choice of a ﬁscal federal system, we
carry out some simulations that diﬀer in the assumption about the strength
of the solidarity parameter. If the taste for solidarity is weak, the decentral-
ized solution prevails as a dominant solution, as it is closer to the eﬃciency
frontier and is not Pareto dominated by any centralized solution. For a cer-
tain range of parameters, though, a mixed model that combines a minimum
centrally ﬁnanced level of public good with a decentralized solution, Pareto
dominates the decentralized solution. If solidarity preferences are strong,
the decentralized solution is Pareto dominated by several solutions of both
the centralized and the mixed systems.
Our theoretical model gives rationale to the observation that across coun-
tries the degree of ﬁscal decentralization varies, without the need to conclude
that some countries are choosing ineﬃcient systems of decentralization. It
also suggests that the stronger the solidarity preferences of individuals in a
country, the less decentralized that country should be. We oﬀer some em-
pirical evidence to corroborate the negative relationship between solidarity
and decentralization predicted by our model.
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